Background
As the UN reform agenda accelerates under the so-called UN 2.0 / UN80 framework, it is critical that the ILO Staff Union and the broader ILO community reflect strategically on what is at stake, and how best to safeguard the Organization’s distinctive mandate, structure, and working conditions.
While improving efficiency across the UN system is a legitimate goal, the manner in which some of these reforms are being approached in the ILO raises significant institutional, governance, and labour concerns. Among others, there are several issues that deserve closer scrutiny and a coordinated response.
A dangerous path: gradual assimilation into the UN system
There is a growing perception, and not without cause, that the ILO is taking steps to align its administrative and operational model more closely with that of the UN Secretariat, sometimes without sufficient justification or regard for the Organization’s unique features.
This includes recent decisions or proposals to:
- adopt ICSC recommendations without challenge;
- cut entitlements and benefits traditionally recognized as part of ILO-specific conditions of service;
- promote further consolidation and decentralization of back-office services;
- join inter-agency structures without clear safeguards for tripartite oversight or quality control.
While the stated motivation is usually “efficiency” or harmonization, the cumulative effect of such moves risks eroding the ILO’s institutional independence, both in practice and perception, and diminishing its ability to act as a truly tripartite, member-driven technical agency.
Strategic risks
– Loss of functional autonomy: Full alignment with ICSC and UN administrative systems would reduce ILO’s ability to shape working conditions aligned with its mandate.
– Dilution of tripartite cooperation: Proposals to merge or shift services to other UN institutions or agencies would weaken the oversight and influence of constituents.
– Delegitimization of the ILO model: Adopting UN-wide reforms without exception risks making the ILO indistinguishable from other agencies.
The ILO’s discretion in applying ICSC decisions and participating in UN reforms
While the ILO Staff Regulations (Article 14.7) provide a procedure for the Director-General to give effect to decisions of the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) and of the General Assembly, notably in areas such as salary scales, allowances, travel standards, and duty station classifications, such amendments must not prejudice the acquired rights of staff, and must follow consultation with the Joint Negotiating Committee. The Governing Body must also approve or be informed, depending on the nature of the amendment.
This means that, while there is a mechanism for aligning with ICSC decisions, the ILO retains discretion and procedural safeguards. In particular, alignment is not automatic or mandatory: it must be assessed in terms of financial, policy, and institutional implications, and must respect the Organization’s internal processes and tripartite governance.
Similarly, participation in system-wide UN reforms is not a legal obligation. As a specialized agency governed by its own Constitution and Staff Regulations, the ILO has previously opted out of broader UN measures, when these were not fit for purpose or posed risks to its technical and tripartite model.
Recent steps taken by the ILO Administration suggest a trend toward convergence with the wider UN system. This includes proposals to adopt benefit cuts aligned with ICSC recommendations and move towards centralized service delivery models. While presented as cost-saving or efficiency measures, these decisions risk undermining the ILO’s institutional specificity, particularly its tripartite structure, its independence in managing delivery, and its established working conditions for staff.
Recent IGDS Measures: Confirming the Risk
The newly released IGDS No. 700 (v1), dated 16 May 2025, confirms and formalizes many of the concerns outlined above. The document introduces immediate operational measures including hiring freezes, the non-replacement of up to 80% of retirees, a reduction of external collaborators by 40%, and tighter travel rules, under the label of efficiency. These measures may lead to under-resourced teams, loss of expertise, heavier workloads, and an overall decrease in institutional capacity, posing real risks to the delivery of the Programme and Budget and the quality of technical support to constituents. Tripartite field-level engagement may be weakened by fewer missions and less ILO presence. Staff churn and unfilled retirements will disproportionately affect field expertise.
Crucially, the IGDS reaffirms the Office’s alignment with UN system reforms and explicitly links the measures to the UN common system. It also signals structural changes to come in areas such as leave entitlements, mobility, contracts, and career management, many of which will be negotiated with the Staff Union. Pending a financial and managerial review of the actual impact of these measures, it seems unlikely that they will result in meaningful savings. Instead, they question the very logic of the tripartite model: many of the benefits under review are grounded in ILO’s normative standards and the result of negotiated agreements with the Staff Union over decades.
The proposal for a voluntary termination scheme available to “any” staff member raises additional concerns. While presented as a workforce adjustment tool, this measure is unlikely to be strategic in effect. Decisions to leave will largely reflect individual personal or family circumstances, such as alternative employment prospects, mortgages, or children in school, rather than operational need. The result may be an uneven outflow of talent and institutional memory, which again threatens programme delivery and long-term capacity.
Furthermore, worsening working conditions through higher workloads, uncertainty, job insecurity, and reduced benefits are likely to exacerbate mental health issues and related sick leave, which have already risen in recent years within the Office. The proposed measures risk worsening this trend, undermining staff well-being and further impacting ILO delivery.
Lack of justification or transparency in proposed changes
To date, the administration has not offered public evidence of crisis-level financial stress and has not provided clear presentation of financial or operational justifications for many of the changes being proposed or implemented. Specifically:
- The approved budget for the biennium was already endorsed by the Governing Body. There is no severe financial crisis that would justify radical measures being rushed through.
- There is no public calculation of the actual savings expected from measures such as benefit cuts, relocations, or restructuring.
- It is unclear how or where any resources saved would be reallocated, or whether they would remain within ILO programming.
- Most proposed changes appear to be adopted pre-emptively, in anticipation of UN reforms, without assessing whether they are fit for purpose in the ILO’s context.
The approved budget already reflects zero nominal growth. These measures go beyond budget discipline: they reshape the Office in ways that require tripartite oversight and serious justification. Constituents and staff are entitled to ask: why now, and why so fast? It is entirely legitimate and necessary to demand from the Administration a full justification and impact assessment, alongside a justification for urgency, for any proposed change that affects staff conditions, operational models, or governance mechanisms. Radical changes to conditions and structures should not proceed without a transparent rationale and constituent oversight.
The risk to the tripartite model and why constituents should care
This is not just about internal structures or staff conditions. These reforms have far-reaching implications for the ILO’s mandate and tripartite model.
If, for example, this trend of assimilation into the UN system goes further and project implementation is shifted toward centralized structures under the Resident Coordinator or even UNDP, constituents risk losing their voice in how projects are developed and executed, which is a concern already raised by Employers and Workers in the past. As efficient and rational as this model may seem, it would undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of ILO interventions on the ground and the very rationale of ILO technical assistance: that it be demand-driven, negotiated, and shaped by the tripartite constituents in each country.
We are now entering a critical window, where constituents can still intervene to preserve the ILO’s operational and normative independence. But this requires them being properly informed of the risks and of their right to push back.
The ILO’s leadership role in the UN80 process
It is worth noting that the ILO has been designated as co-lead of one of the thematic working groups under UN80, alongside the ITU. While this gives the Office visibility and a voice in shaping reforms, it also places it at the centre of pressure to conform to system-wide models, which may not be suited to the ILO’s mandate or institutional DNA.
We should therefore ask:
- What is the ILO’s official position within the UN80 process?
- What safeguards are being adopted to protect the Organization’s independence, operational flexibility, and tripartite accountability?
- Has the Governing Body been fully briefed and endorsed this harmonization agenda? Will the GB be given a chance to provide guidance before implementation?
Will the financial implications of proposed reforms, especially in terms of cost savings, redeployment of funds, and potential trade-offs, be assessed, validated, and disclosed?
Conclusion
The ILO cannot afford a silent reform that, under the banner of “efficiency,” erodes its independence, tripartite legitimacy, and capacity to deliver on its mandate. Constituents have already approved a biennial budget, and no emergency or radical budget shortfall has been cited to justify hasty structural overhauls. If we speak clearly and strategically, both as staff and in alliance with our constituents, we can help ensure that the ILO remains true to its founding principles while adapting to the future.
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